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The Search for Clean Cash* 
 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has been an innovator of university funding 
models, says David Kaiser. Its 150-year history holds lessons for today. 
 
 One hundred and fifty years ago this week, on 10 April, 1861, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) received its charter. Though hardly the oldest institution of 
higher learning in the Anglo-American world—Harvard was already well into its third 
century by then, and Cambridge and Oxford were each on the cusp of their eighth—MIT 
quickly became a trendsetter. Founder William Barton Rogers built a curriculum around 
the school’s motto ‘Mens et Manus’: mind and hand. He and his early faculty 
incorporated laboratory instruction into the most elementary undergraduate courses and 
fostered close ties between basic science and the practical arts—pedagogical innovations 
that quickly inspired many imitators. 
 Perhaps the most influential of MIT’s many innovations, however, lay not in 
curricula or textbooks but in patronage. How and by whom should research and teaching 
be underwritten at a world-class university? Time and time again over its short history, 
MIT has experimented with novel forms of funding. While preparing a book on MIT[1], I 
learned just how vigorously the pendulum has swung between government and private 
funds. Every few decades, a decision inspired impassioned charges about whose money 
appeared appropriate or tainted, eliciting spirited hand-wringing from faculty, 
administrators and alumni about what consequences might befall the scholarly 
community should the wrong choice be made. Each new scheme unleashed a battle for 
the soul of MIT. Yet proposals that had struck observers as bizarre or brash upon first 
hearing were quickly absorbed into daily operations, and promptly emulated elsewhere.  
 Amid today’s economic uncertainty, universities around the world again face 
difficult questions about how to fund their operations. Reflecting on MIT’s experiences 
throws these struggles into sharper relief, reminding us that today’s bandits were 




 Just two days after MIT’s charter was signed, mortar rounds began to fall on Fort 
Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina: the US Civil War had begun. Though it hardly 
seemed a propitious start for the young institute, the outbreak of war bought Rogers time 
to continue searching for funds.  
 Fifteen months into the fighting, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the 
Morrill Land Grant Act. The law, which had been opposed by several southern states 
before they seceded, allowed individual states to sell federal land and use the profit to 
fund colleges that focused on applied or practical topics, such as agriculture or 
engineering. “Land-grant colleges” quickly sprouted across the United States, nearly all 
of them public institutions. Rogers convinced the state legislature of Massachusetts to 
donate a handsome portion of its land-grant funds to the fledgling MIT—a private 
institution—in exchange for promising to offer military instruction to all its students. The 
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infusion of government cash then enabled Rogers to convince private donors that MIT 
was worth the investment. From the start, MIT thus functioned as a financial oddity: a 
private university buoyed by public funds.  
 By the end of World War I, having fended off several merger attempts from 
nearby Harvard—which struck faculty and alumni as hostile-takeover bids—MIT found 
its budget strained to the limit. In 1919, MIT’s president launched a new campaign 
known as the Tech Plan. Until that time, MIT, like virtually all other US universities, had 
relied on student tuition, private philanthropy, and occasional grants from local industries 
to fund research. Unlike those earlier efforts, this ambitious plan re-built MIT’s entire 
operation around corporate patronage. It created a centralized Division of Industrial 
Cooperation and Research—the forerunner of today’s ubiquitous ’technology transfer 
offices’—to facilitate corporate-funded research projects on campus, open the Institute’s 
libraries to industrial sponsors, and share alumni records with corporate recruiters. 
Nothing like this had been attempted before in US higher education. MIT’s Tech Plan 
immediately attracted hundreds of firms and generated hundreds of thousands of dollars 
(several million dollars in today’s currency). From the start, it also courted controversy. 
A decade after the Tech Plan was established, well over one-third of the faculty 
were conducting work for a corporate sponsor. What sort of work? Faculty found it 
difficult to say, because many of the arrangements forebade publication of results without 
the off-campus sponsor’s approval. Sentiment on campus for the Tech Plan further 
soured after the stock-market crash of 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression. 
Annual budgets for departments such as Electrical Engineering plummeted 60% in just 
four years. A growing chorus concluded that MIT had been short-sighted to rely so 
heavily on corporate patronage, which, after all, could be as fickle as the latest business 
cycle. Critics went further: overreliance on industrial funding was corrupting. In pursuit 




 The time had come for a new funding model, but few alternatives seemed 
obvious. The Morrill Act notwithstanding, many fiscally conservative administrators at 
private universities across the country—from MIT to Stanford—believed that the federal 
government had no business meddling in local affairs such as higher education. Self-
made entrepreneurs, industrialists, and philanthropists were one thing; federal bureaucrats 
quite another. Their peers at public universities, who relied upon state legislatures for 
funding, largely agreed. Yet the stark economic realities of the 1930s forced MIT vice-
president Vannevar Bush to reconsider federal patronage. No industrial partners could 
rival the research budgets of huge New Deal projects like the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, the sprawling, government-owned company founded in 1933 to investigate 
everything from agricultural productivity to hydroelectric power (see 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7232/full/457959a.html).  
 Bush’s administrative solution was to rely upon contracts with the federal 
government. Both this funding source and the legal arrangement--contracts rather than 
grants or donations--were novel. To keep up the appearance of fair-market transactions 
between autonomous agents, Bush insisted that MIT, desperate for cash though it may be, 
hammer out contracts at the negotiating table like any other private enterprise, rather than 
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seemingly begging for handouts. Bush took this novel form of research sponsorship with 
him to the brand-new National Defense Research Committee in June 1940, and its 
successor, the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), in 1941. On 
Bush’s watch, the OSRD awarded thousands of research contracts to universities across 
the United States, for everything from radar to the atomic bomb. 
 More of those wartime research contracts flowed to MIT than to any other 
university. By 1945 MIT had secured defense-related research contracts worth three 
times more than those of stalwart industrial contractors Western Electric (AT&T), 
General Electric, RCA, DuPont, and Westinghouse combined. More than 90% of MIT’s 
annual operating budget derived from federal research contracts. In short order, MIT’s 
model became the basic template for research universities across the United States. Other 
institutions—most famously Stanford’s energetic dean and later provost, Frederick 
Terman—studied MIT’s transformation and sought to replicate it. After the tremendous 
upheavals of wartime, few seemed to question anymore whether the federal government 
was an appropriate source of funding for basic research and university education. The 
sheer scale of funding—which continued to rise after the onset of the Cold War—quickly 
cemented the new normal.  
 During the fifties and sixties, federal patronage drove the steepest expansion of 
higher education in American history (if not the whole world). The new contracts, largely 
from military and defense-related agencies, underwrote massive new equipment on 
campus such as nuclear reactors and electronic computers, opening up unparalleled 
opportunities for faculty and students. Few questioned the relationship too sharply until 
the escalation of fighting in the Vietnam War in the late 1960s. Only then did a critical 
mass of campus voices reconsider whether the Pentagon had any proper role to play in 
the education business. Government money once again seemed ‘dirty’. 
 The stage was set for some new funding model. Not long after the campus 
protests had faded, molecular biologists began to worry about potential dangers from 
recombinant-DNA (rDNA); Cambridge emerged as one of the first cities in the United 
States to forge its own rules and procedures to allow such research. In short order the area 
near MIT’s campus became known as ‘gene town’, an incubator for private 




 The revolving door that has since existed between MIT life scientists, their 
students, corporate boards of directors and venture capitalists has surely been a great 
boon for research. But who benefits? Many critics fear that modern non-disclosure 
agreements are just as stifling as the corporate censorship rules of the Tech Plan or the 
Defense Department’s classification codes. Other concerns loom as well. How much does 
MIT benefit when faculty members split their time between campus responsibilities and 
spin-off, for-profit, start-up companies? Is private investment any more reliable or 
morally pure than public investment from the federal government?  
 Since the 1980s, MIT has followed a hybrid funding scheme, with clear roots in 
its earlier experiments. At last count, MIT receives about one-half of its annual budget 
from non-military branches of the federal government (the largest share from the 
Department of Health and Human Services, which includes the National Institutes of 
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Health); one-sixth from the military; one-quarter from private industries and foundations; 
and the remaining few percent from state, local, and foreign governments. 
 Even the category of private foundations comes with baggage. The latest 
sparkling new building on MIT’s campus—the David H. Koch Institute for Integrative 
Cancer Research, which opened last month—exemplifies the tensions. Billionaire donor 
David Koch, an MIT alumnus and cancer survivor, paid generously for the new building; 
he has donated comparable amounts to refurbish medical centers, museums, and theaters 
across the country. Alongside his philanthropic giving, he has also funded conservative 
political groups associated with the so-called Tea Party, though he denies any direct 
connection with that movement. Deserved or not, his name has become polarizing in 
today’s political climate. At the building’s grand opening, Koch declared that cancer is 
“absolutely nonpartison”[2]. True enough. But patronage, unlike the disease, is all about 
political choices and intellectual trade-offs. 
 Since MIT’s founding, government sources and industrial sponsors have traded 
places several times, each held up alternately as savoir or poisoned fruit. As its history 
has shown, no single model can claim the mantle of angels. All patronage involves a 
delicate balance between opening up new opportunities and mortgaging intellectual 
autonomy. Rather than focus on the source of cash—public or private—we must 
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